We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is veri…able (dimension 1) and one dimension is not veri…able (dimension 2).
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shows that if one dimension of quality is veri…able, while one dimension of quality is not, then the introduction of a P4P-program may increase the veri…able quality dimension, which will increase patients'bene…t, but may decrease the non-veri…able one, which will reduce patients'bene…t. The overall welfare e¤ect is therefore ambiguous. The purpose of this study is to investigate two related questions: 1) under what conditions is it desirable to introduce a Pay-for-Performance incentive scheme? 2) If the introduction is desirable, how strong should be the power of the optimal incentive scheme?
We show that the optimal incentive scheme depends critically on the extent to which quality 1 (the veri…able dimension) increases or decreases providers'marginal disutility and patients' marginal bene…t of quality 2 (the non-veri…able one), i.e. the extent to which quality 1 and 2 are substitutes or complements. Quality dimensions can be substitutes when they are time consuming for the doctor or the provider, so that an increase in one dimension of quality tends to reduce the other dimension. Quality dimensions can be complements in the presence of scope economies or learning by doing: if induced to increase quality in one dimension, the provider becomes better at providing the other dimension as well. The Quality and Outcome Framework program in the UK illustrates other examples of cases where quality dimensions may be susbstitutes and complements. This program mainly focused on the care of people with ten targeted chronic conditions. In a survey with a random national sample of GPs in England conducted before the introduction of the P4P-contract, nearly one-third of the GPs thought that care for patients with acute conditions would deteriorate as a result of the increase in quality for chronic conditions (i.e. these quality dimensions are substitutes; Whalley et al., 2008) . 1 Sutton et al. (2008) estimate the possible spillovers from veri…able to non-veri…able quality dimensions in the QOF-contract by analyzing annual rates of recording of clinical e¤ective factors (blood pressure, cholesterol, alcohol consumption, etc.) from 315 general practices over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . They …nd that, following the introduction of the QOF, the recording of nonveri…able, clinically-e¤ective factors for the targeted groups increased by 10.9 percentage points (i.e. quality dimensions are complements).
We might intuitively expect that the incentive scheme will be low powered when quality dimensions are substitutes. This intuition holds true in some circumstances. However, we show that in some cases the optimal incentive scheme can instead be high-powered even when the two quality dimensions are substitutes. Moreover, in other cases it may well arise that the incentive scheme breaks down.
In more detail, we show that if the two quality dimensions are substitutes, three possible solutions arise. 1) The incentive scheme breaks down: it is not optimal to introduce Pay for Performance as the gain of welfare from an increase in quality dimension 1 is lower than the loss of welfare from a reduction in quality dimension 2. This result arises when the bene…ts from the quality dimension that is not veri…able are relatively more important.
2) The optimal incentive scheme is low powered : the price for the veri…able quality 1 is below the marginal bene…t of quality 1. Both quality dimensions are positive. This result arises when the bene…ts from the quality dimension that is veri…able are relatively more important but need to be traded o¤ with the reductions in the quality dimension that is not veri…able.
3) The optimal incentive scheme is high powered : the price for the veri…able quality 1 is equal to the marginal bene…t of quality dimension 1 and the optimal quality in dimension 2 is zero. This result arises when the quality dimension that is not veri…able falls quickly to the minimum when the price is raised, while the bene…ts from the quality dimension that is veri…able are large. This is, to some extent, a surprising result, as we would intuitively expect the incentive scheme to have low power when quality dimensions are substitutes.
If the two quality dimensions are complements, the incentive scheme is always high powered. The price for the veri…able quality 1 is above the marginal bene…t of quality dimension 1. Both quality dimensions are positive.
We also compare our solutions with what can be obtained if both dimensions of quality are veri…able and the optimal prices are implemented. Obviously, the second-best quality, when quality dimension 2 is not veri…able, is generally di¤erent from the …rst-best quality, when quality dimension 2 is also veri…able, however not necessarily lower. Second-best veri…able quality may be higher in second best if the two dimensions of quality are complements. This follows since providing incentives for the veri…able quality is an indirect way of incentivising the non-veri…able quality.
This study contributes to the literature on provider incentives in health care. Despite the increase in the use of performance indicators, most of the existing theoretical literature assumes that quality is not veri…able (for example Pope, 1989; Ma, 1994; Rogerson, 1994; Ellis, 1998; Ellis and McGuire, 1990; Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b; Mougeot and Naegelen, 2005) . As quality indicators become increasingly available, quality becomes partially veri…able. Therefore, there is increasing scope for analysing incentive schemes within this imperfect environment. As far as the authors are aware, this is one of the …rst attempts to derive the optimal incentive scheme when such indicators are available within the healthcare sector.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the main assumptions of the model and derives the equilibrium price when only one dimension of quality is veri…able.
Section 3 provides comparative statics with respect to the price. Sections 4 derives the …rst-best solution, when both dimensions of quality are veri…able, and compares it with the second-best solution derived in section 2. Section 5 discusses possible extensions of the model. Section 6 concludes.
The model
There are two active players, the sponsor (the payer or a purchaser of health services) and the provider (a hospital or a family doctor). The sponsor provides reimbursement to the provider, and the provider exerts e¤ort on two quality tasks. In addition, fully insured patients, whose bene…t is increasing in the quality provided on both tasks, seek treatment to the provider. The model is solved by backwards induction, starting with the provider's choice of quality levels.
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The provider
There are two dimensions of quality, q 1 and q 2 : The disutility from exerting quality e¤ort q 1 and q 2 is (q 1 ; q 2 ). The disutility is increasing in quality and strictly convex: q i > 0, q i q i > 0, where q i := @ i =@q i and q i q i := @ 2 i =@q 2 i for i = 1; 2. If the two dimensions of quality are substitutes, then an increase in quality 1 increases the marginal disutility of quality 2 and q 2 q 1 > 0. If they are complements, an increase in quality 1 reduces the marginal disutility of quality 2 and q 2 q 1 < 0. We also assume q 1 (0; q 2 ) = q 2 (q 1 ; 0) = 0,
Patients'bene…t from receiving quality q 1 and q 2 is B(q 1 ; q 2 ) with B q i > 0, and B q i q i 0, i = 1; 2: Patients'bene…t increases with quality and is concave. If B q 1 q 2 = 0 then the two dimensions of quality are independent. If B q 1 q 2 < 0 then an increase in quality 1 decreases the marginal bene…t of quality 2, and the two dimensions of quality are substitutes. If B q 1 q 2 > 0 then an increase in quality 1 increases the marginal bene…t of quality 2, and the two dimensions of quality are complements. We will consider all these three cases, although the presence of complementarity in quality seems more plausible. To simplify the exposition and without loss of generality, we assume that the third-order derivatives on patients'bene…t and provider's disutility are zero. We also assume B q i q i > B q i q j .
The incentive scheme is based only on the veri…able dimension of quality q 1 . That is, we assume that no contract on q 2 can be enforced: it is prohibitively costly to specify this outcome ex ante in such a way that it can be veri…ed by a court ex post. Therefore, the payment (price or bonus) can be based only on q 1 and not q 2 . The payment for each unit of veri…able quality q 1 is p 0. Below we will refer to p as the price. The provider also receives a lump-sum payment T 0: 2
The provider is semi altruistic (see Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a; Eggleston, 2005; Jack, 2005) . Altruism is captured by the parameter 0.
Provider's utility from providing quality q 1 and q 2 to a representative patient is
subject to q 1 0, q 2 0. Suppose that both quality dimensions are positive in equilibrium (q 1 > 0, q 2 > 0). Then the optimal levels of quality provided by the provider are given by the following First Order Conditions (FOCs):
The optimal quality for dimension 1 is determined such that the marginal bene…t from the price plus the altruistic component are equal to the marginal disutility of providing quality. The optimal quality for dimension 2 is determined such that the marginal bene…t from the altruistic component is equal to the marginal disutility.
In the Appendix we show that the Second Order Conditions (SOCs) are satis…ed and
A higher price always increases quality dimension 1 (@q 1 =@p > 0). This follows since a higher price increases the provider's marginal bene…t of providing the veri…able quality.
He therefore responds by increasing q 1 :
The e¤ect of an increase in price on the non-veri…able quality q 2 depends on whether the two quality dimensions are substitutes, independent or complements in patients'bene…ts and provider's disutility.
De…nition 1
The two quality dimensions are substitutes in patients'bene…t and in provider's disutility if q 1 q 2 > 0 and B q 1 q 2 < 0, or if B q 1 q 2 q 1 q 2 < 0. The two quality dimensions are independent if the patient's bene…t and provider's disutility function is separable in the two quality dimensions (B q 1 q 2 = q 1 q 2 = 0), or if B q 1 q 2 q 1 q 2 = 0. The two quality dimensions are complements in patients' bene…t and in provider's disutility when
From equation (4) it follows that an increase in price decreases quality dimension 2 when the two quality dimensions are substitutes in patients' bene…t and in provider's disutility. A higher price increases quality 2 if the two quality dimensions are complements in patient's bene…t and in provider's disutility. In this case introducing a positive price is clearly welfare improving for the patients (compared to no price) although there is still an issue of how to set the optimal price. If patients'bene…t and provider's disutility function is separable in the two quality dimensions then a higher price has no e¤ect on quality 2 but still increases quality 1. Note that it is the overall e¤ect B q 1 q 2 q 1 q 2 which determines the relationship between the quality dimensions: if the two quality dimensions are complements in patients'bene…t but are substitutes in provider's disutility function, then the overall e¤ect will depend on the relative strength of the two e¤ects. As a special case, it can happen that the two e¤ects cancel each other out and B q 1 q 2 q 1 q 2 = 0.
Finally, if the constraint q 2 0 is binding with strict equality (which arises when B q 2 q 2 < 0), then the FOC for quality 1 is:
and @q 1 =@p = 1=( U q 1 q 1 ) > 0. Notice that for any positive level of the price p, the nonnegativity constraint for quality 1 is never binding in equilibrium as quality 1 is always positive (q 1 > 0). This is not the case for quality 2 which can reach zero for su¢ ciently high price p; when the two quality dimensions are substitutes.
The purchaser
The purchaser maximises the di¤erence between patients'bene…t and the transfers to the provider B(q 1 ; q 2 ) T pq 1 subject to the participation constraint: U 0 or T + pq 1 (q 1 ; q 2 ) B(q 1 ; q 2 ). 3 Since this is binding with equality, the problem becomes:
subject to:
B q 2 (q 1 ; q 2 ) q 2 (q 1 ; q 2 ) 0; q 2 0;
where the inequalities in the incentive-compatibility constraints hold with complementary slackness. The question is: will a strictly positive price increase the purchaser's utility?
The trade-o¤ is that a higher price increases quality in dimension 1 and therefore welfare, but might also reduce quality in dimension 2, which reduces welfare.
The First Order Condition with respect to price, if an interior solution exists (i.e. q 2 0 is not binding with strict equality), is: 4 dW (q 1 (p); q 2 (p)) dp
Using the provider's FOCs ( B q 1 q 1 = p), the optimal price is given by
The optimal price is set equal to the marginal bene…t of quality 1 adjusted for the the ratio of the responsiveness of the two quality dimensions to price times the marginal bene…t of quality 2. From this it follows that the optimal price will be below, equal or above 3 We could assume instead that the purchaser maximises a utilitarian welfare function. De…ne as the opportunity cost of public funds. Then a utilitarian welfare function is given by B (1 + ) (T + pq1) + U , which after substituting for U = 0 and setting T + pq1 = B, provides B(1 + + ) (1 + ) . This formulation is similar to Boadway, Marchand and Sato (2004) . Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a) argue that this formulation leads to double counting of the altruistic component, and that the altruistic component into the welfare function should be excluded. If this approach is followed instead, then the welfare function is: B(1 + ) (1 + ) . These alternative formulations would not qualitative impact on our main results. 4 In the Appendix we show that the SOC is satis…ed and the problem is well behaved.
the marginal bene…t of quality 1 depending on whether the two quality dimensions are substitutes, independent or complements in patients'bene…ts and provider's disutility. If the two dimensions are substitutes then the optimal price is below the marginal bene…t of quality 1: p < B q 1 (q 1 (p ); q 2 (p )). If a higher price has no e¤ect on quality 2 (i.e the two dimensions are independent), then the price is equal to the marginal bene…t of quality 1:
Finally, if the two dimensions are complements, then the price is set above the marginal bene…t of quality 1:
If the optimal price is above or equal to the marginal bene…t of quality 1, p B q 1 , we call the incentives high-powered. Similarly, if p < B q 1 ; then the incentives are low-powered.
Notice that if the two dimensions are substitutes, then there is always a level of price p = p such that the level of quality 2 hits zero. In other words, since quality 2 is decreasing in price, there has to be a price high enough to bring quality 2 to zero (the minimum level of enforceable quality). Analytically, if @q 2 =@p < 0 then 9p = p such that q 2 = 0 8p p and dW (q 1 (p); q 2 (p) = 0) dp
The point is that when quality 2 is zero and price is above p, then a marginal increase in price can be welfare improving (reducing) if the marginal bene…t from quality 1 is larger (smaller) than the marginal disutility.
De…ne p sb as the price under the second-best solution. We de…ne this price second best because one dimension of quality is not veri…able. In section 4 we derive the optimal price under the …rst best, i.e. when the two dimensions of quality are veri…able.
The following Propositions 1-4 identify the conditions under which the power of the incentive scheme is respectively zero, positive but low, and high. We …rst investigate the case when it is optimal for the purchaser to set the price equal to zero. In these situations, even if it is possible for the purchaser to write contracts on some dimensions of quality, she prefers not to. Intuitively, this case arises when quality dimension 2 is relatively more important for the sponsor, and when a positive price shifts the provider's choice of quality production towards the …rst task. The following Proposition 1 provides a su¢ cient condition for having no incentive scheme, i.e. for setting p sb = 0.
0 and p sb = 0. The incentive scheme breaks down.
Proof. Appendix.
Condition i) in Proposition 1 suggests that quality 2 is relatively more important than quality 1. However, notice that for this condition to hold it is not enough having the marginal bene…t of quality 1 smaller than the marginal bene…t of quality 2 at p = 0. The degree of substitutability between the two quality dimensions q 1 q 2 B q 1 q 2 also has to be su¢ ciently high. If this condition is not met, then the results in Proposition 2 below apply. Condition ii) guarantees that at p = p (the price required to bring quality 2 to zero) the marginal gain from quality 1 is below its marginal disutility, and an additional increase in price would reduce welfare. Figure 1 .a illustrates the solution. 5 The solid line provides the welfare when both quality dimensions are allowed to vary, and the dotted line the welfare when quality 2 is set to zero. The two lines cross at p = p. It is straightforward to verify that the optimal price p is in this case equal to zero. The incentive scheme breaks down. The purchaser is better o¤ without the incentive scheme.
Condition (ii) in Proposition 2 is su¢ cient. As Figure 1 .b shows, even if there are gains in quality 1 that can be obtained from an increase in price after quality 2 has hit zero (i.e. even if dW=dpj p=p > 0), it may still be optimal to have no incentive scheme and set p sb = 0. This arises if the welfare when the two dimensions of quality are strictly positive is higher than the welfare when the veri…able quality 1 is set at the level where marginal bene…t equals marginal disutility while the non-veri…able quality 2 is set equal to zero (the minimum enforceable level).
[ The following Proposition 2 establishes conditions that ensure p sb = p ; where p is the price derived in Eq.(10) when q 2 is strictly positive (i.e. the constraint q 2 0 is not binding).
Proposition 2 Suppose that: (i) quality 1 and 2 are substitutes; (ii) B q 1 (p = 0)
Then, dW (p = 0)=dp > 0 and the optimal price is below the marginal bene…t of quality 1:
The incentive scheme is low powered.
Proposition 2 suggests that when conditions (i-iii) are met, then the optimal incentive scheme is low-powered and the price is below the marginal bene…t of quality dimension 1. Condition ii) requires that if no incentive scheme is introduced (i.e. p = 0), then the marginal bene…t from quality dimension 1 is higher than the marginal bene…t from quality dimension 2 (quality 1 matters more to the patients than quality 2). Condition iii) says that at p = p, the price required to bring quality 2 to zero, the marginal gain from quality 1 is below its marginal disutility. In other words, at p = p an additional increase in price and in quality 1 would reduce welfare.
This case resembles situations where quality dimension 1 is relatively more important for the purchaser but has a negative impact on the other quality dimension. In these cases, the price is positive but low-powered since a too high price will crowd-out valuable quality on the non-veri…able task. to zero. The two lines cross at p = p; where quality 2 is equal to zero in both welfare functions. Note that for p > p quality 2 is negative along the solid line while it is positive when p < p. Therefore, the relevant welfare is the solid line for p < p and the dotted line for p p. Since welfare is decreasing for p p along the dotted line, it is straightforward that the welfare-maximising price is p sb = p .
Conditions i-iii) in Proposition 2 are su¢ cient but not necessary for p sb = p . Instead of the su¢ cient conditions i-ii), a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for Proposition 1 to hold is the weaker condition: B q 1 B q 2 q 2 + q 2 q 2 > B q 2 q 1 q 2 B q 1 q 2 . This condition can hold even when the marginal bene…t from quality 1 is smaller than the marginal bene…t from quality 2 as long as the degree of substitutability between the two quality dimensions is su¢ ciently small. The condition guarantees that the introduction of a price is welfare improving, dW=dp(p = 0) > 0, and that p > 0. However, it does not establish whether p generates the maximum welfare. Whether it does it depends on how the welfare function varies with p for p > p: If dW=dpj p=p < 0 (the marginal welfare from an increase in quality 1 is negative when quality 2 hits zero), then p is certainly a maximum, as Figure 2 .a has shown. However, this is again a su¢ cient condition. Figure   2 .b shows the case where dW=dpj p=p > 0 (the marginal welfare from an increase in quality 1 is positive when quality 2 hits zero) but p sb = p is still a maximum. In Figure 2 .b, the price e p denotes the price such that e p =:
dW (q 1 (p);q 2 (p)=0) dp p p = 0. If the optimal price p sb = p is positive, then the FOC can be rewritten as:
The optimal price is such that the marginal welfare gain from an increase in quality dimension 1 is equal to the marginal welfare loss from a reduction in quality dimension 2.
The optimality condition for the price p sb = p can also be written in terms of elasticities:
6 In Figure 2 .a and 2.b we assume a1 = b1 = 1 = 2 = 1, a2 = 2; b2 = 0 and m = 0:5. For Figure 2 .a we set = 0:2; while = 0:1 for Figure 2 .b.
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where W q i = @W=@q i (q i =W ) denotes the elasticity of welfare with respect to quality dimension i and q i p = @q i =@p(p=q i ) the elasticity of quality i with respect to price. The optimal price is such that the product of the elasticity of welfare with respect to quality and the elasticity of quality with respect to price are equal for each quality dimension. 7
The following two propositions establish conditions for having high-powered incentive schemes. Proposition 3 shows that the optimal incentive scheme can be high powered even though the two quality dimensions are substitutes.
Proposition 3 Suppose that : (i) quality 1 and 2 are substitutes;
The incentive scheme is high powered.
Condition ii) ensures that, once quality 2 hits zero, welfare increases with price for p > p up to price p = e p. In words, when quality 2 is driven to zero, a marginal increase in price p is such that the marginal bene…t from quality 1 is bigger than its marginal disutility. This might be the case when the level of altruism is su¢ ciently low, so that quality 2 quickly drops to zero when price increases. Condition iii) guarantees that p = e p is the global maximum. The purchaser is better o¤ when quality 2 is equal to zero, quality 1 is high and the price is equal to the marginal bene…t of quality 1, compared to a scenario where both quality dimensions are positive but low, and the price is set below the marginal bene…t of quality 1.
Figures 3.a-3.c show three possible scenarios. In Figure 3 .a we have dW (p = 0)=dp < 0.
In this case an increase in the price reduces welfare for low p because it reduces a lot quality 2. However, reached price p = p, the level of quality 2 is zero and therefore given assumption ii) welfare increases after that up to price p = e p. Condition (iii) guarantees that p = e p is the global maximum.
In Figure 3 .b we have dW (p = 0)=dp > 0. There is a local maximum at p = p . Once reached price p = p, the level of quality 2 is zero and therefore given our assumption in 7 From Wq 1 @q1=@p = Wq 2 ( @q2=@p), we obtain Wq 1
14 (ii) welfare increases after that up to price p = e p. Condition (iii) guarantees that p = e p is the global maximum. In Figure 3 .a and 3.b it is always the case that p < p < e p. Figure   3 .c provides an example where p < p < e p. 8
[ Figure 3 .a, 3.b, and 3.c]
Finally, our next proposition provides the optimal incentive scheme when the two quality dimensions are complements in the provider's disutility or patients'bene…t function.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the two quality dimensions are complements. Then,
Since the two quality dimensions are complements, the introduction of a positive price increases not only quality 1 but also quality 2. Therefore, in this case the introduction of the price is always welfare improving. However, there is still an issue on how high the price should be set.
Proposition 4 suggests that the optimal price is set above the marginal bene…t of quality dimension 1. In this case we do not need to worry about the constraint q 2 0, because it is always satis…ed with strict inequality. This is because dq 2 =dp > 0.
The optimal price is such that
In equilibrium the marginal welfare gain from an increase in quality 2 is equal to the marginal welfare loss from an increase in quality 1. In this case, the price is set at such a high level that the marginal bene…t from quality 1 is lower than its marginal disutility ((1 + )B q 1 < q 1 ). It is also the case that the marginal bene…t of quality 2 is above its marginal disutility ((1 + )B q 2 > q 2 ).
Recall from De…nition 1 that the two quality dimensions might be complements even when the two quality dimensions are substitutes in the provider's disutility function (if quality dimensions are complements in patients'bene…t and the degree of complementarity is su¢ ciently strong). The empirical results from Sutton et al. (2008) indicate that the complementarity e¤ects between veri…able and non-veri…able quality may be strong. We thus believe that the relevance of this proposition should not be underestimated.
Comparative statics
In this section we provide some comparative-statics results in the case where bene…t and disutility functions are quadratic. The point we want to make is that even in this simple case the interaction between the quality dimensions in patients' bene…ts and provider's disutility make the comparative-statics results quite complex.
Suppose that B(q 1 ; q 2 ) = a 1 q 1 (b 1 =2)q 2 1 + a 2 q 2 (b 2 =2)q 2 2 and (q 1 ; q 2 ) = ( 1 =2)q 2 1 + ( 2 =2)q 2 2 + mq 1 q 2 , so there are no interaction e¤ects in bene…ts. By solving the provider's First Order Conditions (equation (2) and (3)) for the quality levels we obtain:
Then, the optimal price is (follows from equation (10)):
First, we consider the case when the marginal bene…t is constant. In this case the optimal price is decreasing (increasing) in q 1 q 2 = m > 0 (< 0): That is, it is decreasing (increasing) in m when the two quality dimensions are substitutes (complements) in the provider's disutility function. Then we show that if marginal bene…ts are decreasing, the optimal price can be increasing in q 1 q 2 = m even in the case where the quality dimensions are substitutes in the provider's disutility function, i.e. when m > 0:
Constant marginal bene…t
Suppose that the marginal bene…t is constant (b 1 = b 2 = 0). Then the optimal price is
The optimal price p sb is increasing in the marginal bene…t of quality 1 and decreasing in the marginal bene…t of quality 2. The price is decreasing in m, as expected: the more the two quality dimensions are substitutes, the smaller is the price (@p=@m < 0).
The higher the marginal disutility of dimension 2 the higher is the price (@p=@ 2 = a 2 m= 2 2 > 0). This is somewhat counter-intuitive, but follows from the fact that an increase in the marginal disutility of quality 2 reduces quality 2 and thus the marginal disutility of quality 1, which ultimately increases the level of quality 1.
Finally, notice that price does not vary with altruism (since marginal bene…ts are constant) nor with the marginal disutility of quality 1 (as price is equal to marginal bene…t). Note that the above results also hold for small b 1 and b 2 (i.e. for b 1 ! 0 and
Substituting the optimal price into the FOCs of the provider, we obtain
The following corollary establishes how the optimal levels of quality vary with the di¤erent parameters.
Corollary 1 Suppose p > 0. (a) @q i =@m ? 0 with i = 1; 2; (b) @q i =@a i > 0 with i = 1; 2; (c) @q i =@a j < 0 with j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j; (d) @q i =@ i < 0 with i = 1; 2; (e) @q i =@ j > 0 with j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j; (f ) @q i =@ > 0 with i = 1; 2; .
Proof. Appendix.
To understand these results notice that the e¤ect of each parameter on quality re ‡ects the sum of the direct e¤ect on quality plus the indirect e¤ect through the price (see equation (17)). In most cases the indirect e¤ect reinforces the direct e¤ect and the results are unambiguous. For example, each quality level is decreasing in the marginal bene…t of the other quality dimension (@q i =@a j < 0; i = j = 1; 2 and i 6 = j). An increase in a 1 decreases q 2 for two reasons: for a given price, a higher marginal bene…t of quality 1 decreases quality 2 but also implies a higher price which also decreases quality 2 (case c).
In case (a) however, the direct and indirect e¤ect counteract. 9 A higher m implies a more negative spillover e¤ect of a high level of q 1 on the marginal disutility of providing quality 2. This e¤ect tends to reduce quality 1. However, a higher m also implies a tendency to reduce q 2 : this e¤ect tends to increase q 1 . Which e¤ect dominates depends on the relative size of the marginal disutility of producing q 1 and q 2 , and the relative marginal bene…ts (a 1 and a 2 ). If the relative bene…ts favour quality dimension 1 (a 1 large relative to a 2 ; and large relative to marginal disutility) then q 1 tends to increase with m; while q 2 tends to decrease with m: A similar result occurs if the marginal disutility of providing q 1 is relatively small to the marginal disutility of providing q 2 (and the di¤erence in marginal bene…ts is small).
We now comment brie ‡y on the other cases.
(b) Each quality level is increasing in its marginal bene…ts (@q i =@a i > 0, i = 1; 2): a higher marginal bene…t from quality implies a higher price but also a stronger altruistic component for the provider. Both e¤ects induce higher quality in equilibrium.
(d) Each quality level is also decreasing in its own marginal disutility, i.e. @q i =@ i < 0; i = 1; 2. A higher marginal disutility for quality 1, 1 , decreases quality 1 (direct e¤ect) and has no e¤ect on price (follows from equation (19)). A higher marginal disutility for quality 2, 2 , decreases quality 2 (direct e¤ect). In this case there is also an indirect e¤ect 9 The e¤ects of an increase in m is symmetric so we only consider the e¤ect on q1.
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via the price; an increase in 2 increases the price which further decreases quality 2.
(e) Each quality level is increasing in the marginal disutility of the other quality dimension. A higher marginal disutility for quality 2, 2 , reduces the optimal quality 2 and therefore reduces the marginal disutility of quality 1 which increases quality 1; moreover it implies a higher price which also increases quality 1. Similarly, a higher marginal disutility of quality 1, 1 , reduces the optimal quality 1 and therefore reduces the marginal disutility of quality 2 which increases quality 2 (there is no e¤ect through the price).
(f) Higher altruism increases the marginal bene…t of quality and therefore increases quality (direct e¤ect) and has no e¤ect on the price (due to the assumption of constant marginal bene…t).
Decreasing marginal bene…t
We now consider the case with decreasing marginal bene…t. The point we want to make is that the e¤ects of an increase in the degree of substitutability in the disutility function, q 1 q 2 = m; are quite complicated and most often indeterminate when the marginal bene…t is decreasing. For example, it might indeed be the case that the price is actually increasing in m. This happens when marginal bene…ts decrease su¢ ciently fast.
The optimal price is now given by:
Consider the e¤ect of an increase in m > 0. Totally di¤erentiating we obtain:
@q 2 (p sb ) @p dp
Now, since @q 1 (p sb )=@p > 0 and @q 2 (p sb )=@p < 0, then sign dp
If b 1 = b 2 = 0 we obtain as a special case the previous result, so that dp sb =dm < 0.
To show that the optimal price can increase in m > 0 when the marginal bene…t decreases su¢ ciently fast, let = 0:8; a 1 = a 2 = b 1 = b 2 = 2; and let 1 = 2 = 1: Figure   4 shows that dp sb =dm > 0 for some values of m > 0: 10
To see why this result may arise, consider the case where the marginal bene…t of quality 2 is constant, and the marginal bene…t of quality 1 is decreasing (i.e., b 2 = 0; and b 1 > 0).
Moreover, suppose that @q 1 =@m < 0, i.e. higher substitutability reduces the veri…able quality (recall that in general @q 1 =@m is indeterminate even when marginal bene…t is constant). Then, since the marginal bene…t of quality 1 is decreasing, the purchaser reacts to the lower veri…able quality by adjusting upwards the price. If this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong then dp sb =dm > 0.
[ Figure 4 ]
Comparison with First Best
In this section we …rst de…ne the …rst best solution and then compare the results obtained in Propositions 1-4, which we refer to as the second-best solution, with the …rst-best solution. Our main result below is that if the marginal bene…t of quality is constant, then the price under the …rst-best solution will be higher than in the second best if the two quality dimensions are substitutes, as we might intuitively expect. Furthermore, if patients'bene…t is symmetric in both quality dimensions, then both aggregate quality and patients'bene…t are higher in …rst best.
First best
We de…ne the …rst-best solution a setting where the purchaser can observe both quality dimensions and maximize over the quality levels directly. This is equivalent to set two di¤erent prices p 1 and p 2 for q 1 and q 2 respectively. 1 0 With these parameter values q1 > 0; q2 > 0; and the SOC is full…led.
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The purchaser maximises the di¤erence between patients'bene…t and the transfers to the provider B(q 1 ; q 2 ) T p 1 q 1 p 2 q 2 subject to the participation constraint: U 0 or
Since this is binding with equality, the problem becomes:
subject to the incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints (which follow from the provider's First Order Conditions):
The First Order Conditions with respect to price are:
Using the FOCs for the provider (the ICs) we obtain
Hence, the price of each quality dimension is set equal to the marginal bene…t this dimension generates. Furthermore, the optimal level of quality is such that the marginal bene…t of quality (weighted for the altruistic component) is equal to the marginal disutility.
Comparison of …rst best and second best
We start by comparing prices of quality dimension 1. However since both the marginal bene…t and the marginal disutility of quality 1 depends on the level of quality 2 we are 21 not able to compare prices and quality levels without making further assumptions. To compare prices we assume that marginal bene…t of quality dimension 1 is constant, and that marginal bene…t of quality 1 is independent of quality 2. The following corollary compares solutions.
Corollary 2 Proof. Appendix.
The Corollary shows that the second-best price coincides with …rst-best price only when quality 2 is zero in the second best. However, the real allocations, i.e. the choice of quality di¤ers in …rst-and second best also in this case. This follows since q
which implies that welfare will di¤er in …rst-and second-best solution. We now turn to comparing the level of quality under the two settings.
Comparing the levels of quality is not straightforward. The problem is that even if we can rank the prices for quality 1, the marginal disutility of quality 1 depends on the level of quality 2. To compare the levels of quality we impose the following restrictions. First, we assume that marginal bene…t is constant and that the bene…t function is symmetric,
Second, let the disutility function be symmetric, q 1 q 1 = q 2 q 2 : (For simplicity) let the third-order derivatives on disutility be zero so q i q i = > q i q j = m > 0; where the inequality follows from the second-order conditions of the provider's maximization problem. 11
Under these assumptions it follows from equation (29) and (30) that prices and quality for both tasks are identical in the …rst best. Furthermore, it follows from the provider's …rst-order conditions (equation (2) and (3) 
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Lemma 1 Let i) B q 1 q 2 = B q 1 q 1 = B q 2 q 2 = 0; ii) B q 1 = B q 2 ; and iii) q 1 q 1 = q 2 q 2 : If
Hence, when the disutility function and bene…t function are symmetric in the two quality dimensions, quality for the veri…able dimension is higher than for non-veri…able dimension if the second best price is strictly positive.
Since the marginal bene…t is constant and the bene…t function is symmetric, marginal bene…t is equal for both quality dimensions both in …rst and second best. Hence we are able to compare the marginal disutility in …rst best and second best. From the …rst order conditions (equations (2) ; (3) and (30)) we have
where
We thus obtain the following ranking of marginal disutility (the last inequality follows from Lemma 1)
Obviously, the conditions given in (32) holds for q f b > q sb 1 > q sb 2 : The following proposition gives an upper boundary for q sb 2 in the case where q f b < q sb 1 :
Proposition 5 Suppose the conditions in Lemma 1 hold and
Hence, if quality 1 is higher in the second best than in the …rst best, q f b < q sb 1 , then quality 2 is lower in the second best compared to the …rst best, q sb 2 < q f b . Furthermore, aggregate quality and patients'bene…t is lower in the second best compared with the …rst best.
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Discussion
We now comment upon two of the assumptions we have imposed. The …rst one is that provider costs are measured in disutility, and not in monetary costs; the second is that both veri…able and non-veri…able quality are one-dimentional.
In the analysis presented in sections 2-4 we have assumed that providers costs are non-monetary, i.e. that increasing quality in each dimension raises the disutility of the provider. The main hints from our analysis also hold if we reinterpret costs as monetary.
However, if costs are monetary, a limited-liability constraint needs to be added to the problem of the purchaser in addition to the participation constraint. Limited liability implies that the provider cannot make losses. To make the point more clearly, suppose that instead of the disutility function (q 1 ; q 2 ), we assume that all costs are monetary and are captured by the function C(q 1 ; q 2 ), with
dimensions are substitutes, and C q i q j < 0 if quality dimensions are complements. Since the limited-liability constraint is binding, while the participation constraint is not for any positive level of altruism, the purchaser maximises
subject to the usual incentive-compatibility constraints. If both quality dimensions are non-negative, the optimal price is now given by: p = (B q 1 + B q 2 @q 2 =@p @q 1 =@p )(1 ). The optimal price now depends also directly on the degree of altruism, with higher altruism implying a lower price. However, the qualitative features of the optimal price remain unchanged.
In this paper we have assumed that both the veri…able and non-veri…able quality is one-dimensional. This will typically not be the case. For example the contract for UK general practices introduced in 2004 rewarded practices according to performance on 146 indicators. Clearly, also non-veri…able quality will typically be multidimensional.
One way to capture this in the model is to assume that q 1 = (q 11 ; q 21; ; :::; q n1 ) is an ndimensional vector of quality, pq 1 = ! 1 q 11 +! 2 q 21 +:::+! n q n is the scalar product, and ! i ; i = 1; :::n is the weight given to quality dimension i: 12 Similarly, q 2 = (q 12 ; q 22; ; :::; q m2 ) is an m-dimensional vector of non-veri…able quality. By solving the provider's maximisation problem, and using the implicit-function theorem we obtain the comparative statics results that determine if the vectors of quality dimensions are complements or substitutes. What matters is not how each element of the veri…able quality vector relates to one other element of the non-veri…able vector, but the overall interaction e¤ect.
Conclusions
Purchasers make increased use of pay-for-performance incentive schemes in the attempt of fostering quality in the health care sector. However, inevitably some dimensions of quality remain not veri…able. Existing incentive schemes have been criticised on the ground that paying for quality will increase quality in the dimensions that are veri…able but will reduce quality for the dimensions that are not veri…able (Roland, 2004; Whalley et al., 2005) . This criticism then raises the question whether such incentive schemes should be introduced,
and if introduced how powered should be the incentive schemes.
We show that in some cases low powered incentive schemes are optimal. Introducing the scheme is useful in increasing welfare when the quality that is veri…able is relatively important. However, this needs to be traded-o¤ with the reductions in the quality dimension that is not veri…able. In other cases it is optimal not to introduce an incentive scheme. This is likely to be the case when the quality dimensions that are not veri…able are relatively more important.
Finally, there are some cases where the optimal incentive scheme is high powered. This arises in two circumstances. First, if the quality dimension that is not veri…able falls to zero quickly with price (due for example to low altruism), the bene…t from increasing the quality in the dimensions that are veri…able can be quite large. Second, if the di¤erent quality dimensions face some complementarity, then providers become better at providing also the dimensions of quality that are not veri…able, when induced to increase the quality dimensions that are veri…able.
The incentive schemes that have been recently implemented in the US and the UK, suggest that these schemes are reasonably high powered. Our model suggest that this policy is optimal when one of these conditions hold: i) quality dimensions are independent so that an increase in one does not come at the cost of the other; ii) there are some elements of substitutability and complementarity: for example it could be that they are substitutes on costs but they are complements on patients' bene…ts (i.e. the marginal bene…t from the non-veri…able quality increases when the veri…able one is increased); iii) the non-veri…able quality is perceived by the purchaser to be so low, that the marginal gains from an increase in the veri…able quality overcome the losses from a reduction in the non-veri…able one.
Epstein (2006) argues that policy changes might lead to unexpected consequences, such as higher payments to physicians and increased budget de…cits. In the model outlined in this paper providers' utility is the same (since the purchaser adjust the lump-sum payments so that the provider's participation constraint holds with equality). However, the total payments will change when paying for performance is introduced. This follows since the provided levels of quality are (weakly) higher under a regime of paying for performance. Note that this will be an intended e¤ect. In some cases the introduction of paying for performance programs are not matched with a decrease in lump-sum payments, and provider payments might increase unintentionally. The introduction of the paying for performance program for UK family practitioners in 2004 might be such an example since it increased the gross income of the family practitioners by about 20% (Doran et al., 2006) . We believe that a generous performance scheme will reduce resistance against P4P-programs, and hence facilitate their introduction. In the long run we would however expect payments to be adjusted to counteract the unintended consequences observed at the time paying-for-performance schemes are introduced.
References
Atlanta Information Services, 2003, Case studies on physician compensation in medical groups, Washington DC.
Appendix
In this appendix we provide details regarding some of the calculations in this paper.
The Second Order Conditions (SOCs) of the provider's problem are:
U q 1 q 1 = B q 1 q 1 q 1 q 1 < 0; U q 2 q 2 = B q 2 q 2 q 2 q 2 < 0 U where the last inequality follows from the assumption that the SOC is satis…ed.
Since @F 1 =@p = 1; and @F 2 =@p = 0 we obtain @q 1 @p = At p = 0 the condition is dW (q 1 (p);q 2 (p)) dp p<p = Bq 1 ( q 2 q 2 Bq 2 q 2 )+Bq 2 ( Bq 1 q 2 q 1 q 2 )
Uq 1 q 1 Uq 2 q 2 U 2 q 2 q 1 , which is negative when the necessary condition (i) in Proposition 1 is satis…ed.
Proof of Proposition 2.
dW (q 1 (p); q 2 (p)) dp p<p = B q 1 B q 2 q 2 + q 2 q 2 + B q 2 q 1 q 2 + B q 1 q 2 p B q 2 q 2 + q 2 q 2 U q 1 q 1 U q 2 q 2 U 2 q 2 q 1 Therefore, at p = 0 the condition is positive when (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2 are satis…ed.
Proof of Proposition 3.
dW (q 1 (p);q 2 (p)=0) dp p p = [(1 + )B q 1 q 1 ] (@q 1 =@p). Using the FOC p + B q 1 = q 1 , then dW (q 1 (p);q 2 (p)=0) dp p p = (B q 1 p) (@q 1 =@p) = 0, which implies e p = B q 1 .
Proof of Proposition 4. In this case the quality dimension 2 is always strictly positive, q 2 > 0 and therefore p = e p cannot be in equilibrium. The solution is given by p . 
